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Abstract Naturalistic philosophers rely on literature search and review in a number
of ways and for different purposes. Yet this article shows how processes of literature
search and review are likely to be affected by widespread and systematic biases. A
solution to this problem is offered here. Whilst the tradition of systematic reviews
of literature from scientific disciplines has been neglected in philosophy, systematic
reviews are important tools that minimize bias in literature search and review and
allow for greater reproducibility and transparency. If naturalistic philosophers wish to
reduce bias in their research, they should then supplement their traditional tools for
literature search and review by including systematic methodologies.
Keywords Cognitive bias · Heuristics · Naturalism · Systematic review · Narrative
review · Methodology
1 Introduction
Naturalism has been a hugely successful research program in contemporary analytic
philosophy. Naturalistic philosophers have been following Quine (1952) in challenging
the separation of philosophical from scientific research and arguing that philosophy and
science are best conceived of as engaged in essentially the same enterprise, pursuing
similar goals and deploying similar methods.
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Here, it will be argued that there would be benefits for naturalistic philosophers if
they expanded their methodological toolkit. The tools discussed here are the systematic
methodologies for literature search and review that are widely employed in the natural,
life and health sciences.
More in detail, the paper presents and defends the following claims. First, naturalis-
tic philosophers do not philosophize in a vacuum and, in fact, rely on literature search
and review in a number of ways and for several purposes. Second, biases and cognitive
limitations are likely to affect literature search and review in many critical ways. Over
the past decades, psychologists have described numerous ways in which judgment
formation and information search can be biased, and there are no reasons to doubt that
also literature search and review should be biased in important ways, and even in the
field of philosophy. Third, scientists have come to widely adopt systematic reviews to
minimize bias in the activity of literature search and review, and these tools should also
be of wide interest to naturalistic philosophers. More precisely, systematic research
review is a highly structured approach to cumulating knowledge. Progress in knowl-
edge acquisition is the result of the integration of efforts, and literature reviews are
vehicles for summarizing research. For systematic reviews, a clear set of rules exists
for searching studies and for determining which should be included in or excluded
from the analysis. The reproducibility of an experimental result is a fundamental
assumption in science and in a similar fashion systematic reviews aim to allow for
high reproducibility of conclusions by minimizing bias and maximizing transparency.
In the remainder of this paper these claims will be carefully discussed, and then
combined to offer a plea for a type of minimally biased philosophy: if naturalistic
philosophers wish to reduce bias in philosophy, as it is here assumed that they should,
then they should consider ways to supplement their traditional tools for literature
search and review by including systematic reviews.
A few remarks are in order here. Interestingly, a number of researchers have raised
methodological concerns relating to the ones examined here (Steel et al. 2017; Machery
2016; Machery and Cohen 2012; Faust and Meehl 2002), focusing more specifically
on the limitations of the case-study method in the context of the philosophy of science.
In light of their concerns, some of these researchers have also ventured to recommend
the use of alternative and quantitative methods (Machery 2016), such as those used
in the field bibliometrics, and which often involve formal tools. These are valuable
recommendations and some philosophers have already offered interesting applications
of quantitative tools from bibliometrics (e.g., Wray and Bornmann 2015). Still, it
seems indeed quite surprising that among the several tools proposed to complement
the philosophers’ toolbox systematic reviews have not as yet been considered. The
systematic methodologies advocated here are meant to offer tools for wide use in the
philosophical community. As shown in this essay, these methodologies help minimize
bias and are applicable to a broad range of questions.1
The wide applicability of systematic reviews invites some further considerations.
Specifically, this essay recommends the use of systematic reviews within naturalistic
philosophy, but there are also reasons to think that the concerns discussed here do
1 I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing my attention to this important aspect.
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affect other philosophical approaches as well, which could also benefit from a more
systematic approach to literature search and review. After all, systematic reviews have
already been applied to non-empirical literature in the humanities and social sciences
(Strech and Sofaer 2012; McDougall and Notini 2013), suggesting that a suitable model
of systematic review could in principle be applied to broad areas of philosophical
inquiry. Still, two considerations seem to justify the choice to focus more narrowly on
naturalistic philosophy in this paper. First, as naturalistic philosophers see science and
philosophy as part of the same enterprise, they are also plausibly more likely to listen to
the concerns examined here and to import tools from scientific disciplines. Second, it
is generally clearer how to apply systematic tools and methods to surveys of empirical
results, and hence recommendations can be more concrete and specific in this case.2
This essay is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the ways in which naturalistic
philosophers rely on literature search and review. Section 3 argues that processes
involved in literature search and review are likely to be biased in non-trivial ways.
Section 4 compares narrative and systematic approaches to literature search and review
and discusses the virtues of the latter approaches. Section 5 strengthens the case for
the adoption of systematic methodologies by naturalistic philosophers and offers some
practical recommendations concerning research, publishing and training practices.
Finally, Sect. 6 delivers the conclusion.
2 Naturalistic philosophy and literature review
A hot topic in metaphilosophy concerns how best to describe the methods used by
philosophers and their practices. Many of the recent discussions on this topic have
focused on whether, to what extent, and how analytic philosophy rests on the use of
intuitions (e.g., Cappelen 2012; Andow 2016). Still, we should not underestimate the
importance of literature search and review for the philosophical profession, at least in
many areas of philosophical investigation.
Arguably, philosophers’ reliance on literature search and review is particularly evi-
dent in the case of naturalistic philosophy.3 Naturalism comes in different forms, and a
distinction is often made between experimental and empirical philosophy (Prinz 2008;
Rose and Danks 2013). Experimental philosophy has recently adopted methodolo-
gies from various sciences—typically behavioural, social and cognitive sciences—and
engaged in a number of empirical projects to answer philosophically interesting ques-
tions (Knobe and Nichols 2008; Alexander 2012; Sytsma and Buckwalter 2016;
2 I wish to thank an anonymous referee for this journal for helping me clarify these points.
3 In other areas of philosophy, one could argue that things stand differently. For instance, John Passmore
writes that “philosophers often seem to feel that they have a positive duty to conceal the origins of their
thought. Alone in this—or in company only with journalists—they write articles which are wholly devoid
of footnotes, which make no reference whatever to the previous literature on the same subject (1965, p. 4).
Ludwig Wittgenstein, for example, provided us with one example of such attitude. In the preface of his
Tractatus logico-philosophicus, he wrote: “How far my efforts agree with those of other philosophers I will
not decide. Indeed what I have here written makes no claim to novelty in points of detail; and therefore I
give no sources, because it is indifferent to me whether what I have thought has already been thought before
me by another” (1922, p. 27).
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Sytsma and Livengood 2015). Empirical philosophers use instead in their philosoph-
ical theorizing empirical results acquired by professional scientists. More precisely,
they search for, screen and cite relevant empirical research outputs. As Jesse Prinz put
it, “empirical philosophy works by citation” (2008, p. 200). What matters, here, is that
this characterization of empirical philosophy seems to capture a great deal of work in
naturalistic philosophy; if we asked what naturalistic philosophers actually do when
they carry out philosophical research, a plausible answer could not help but mention
their engagement with literature search and review as an important aspect of it.
Still, there are different types of activity that require a thorough literature review to
be conducted, and different uses of literature review exist. Naturalistic philosophers
use empirical findings to support their claims and premises. They also often con-
tribute to scientific theorizing by providing novel hypotheses, synthesizing swathes of
empirical and theoretical works, and suggesting empirical research. Most typically,
naturalistic philosophers cite neuroscientists and psychologists, but they also call on
linguists, evolutionary biologists, roboticists, and anthropologists, as well as physicists
or chemists.
There are plenty of well-known works from naturalistic philosophers that can
exemplify these uses. Yet mentioning a few paradigmatic examples might be help-
ful here. For instance, philosopher Clark (2013) extensively surveyed scholarly work
to argue that brains are fundamentally prediction-error minimizing devices trying to
self-generate the sensory streams that are currently arriving from the world. Further,
philosophers have also appealed to empirical research to diagnose problems affecting
their research community and ameliorate the prospects for philosophical research. In
particular, Saul (2013) linked the topic of underrepresentation of women in philoso-
phy to empirical research on implicit bias. She stresses that ‘over the last few decades,
psychologists have established very clearly that human beings, even those who hold
strongly egalitarian ideals, are prone to a range of unconscious biases against members
of groups that are stigmatized in certain areas’ (p. 243). Moreover, Prinz (2004) has
offered an up-to-date version of William James’s theory of emotion that he takes to
be well supported by the wealth of evidence from empirical psychology and neuro-
science that he discusses. Still, whilst literature on cognitive science has garnered a
huge deal of attention within naturalistic philosophy, there are plenty of other empirical
subjects that have direct relevance to philosophical theorizing. For instance, philoso-
phers have looked at quantum mechanics to inform their discussions over free will
(e.g., Loewer 1996; Hodgson 2002) or consulted literature from physics (e.g. Leslie
1982, 1992) to draw considerations about morality, evolution or cosmology connected
to the anthropic principle (Carter 1974). The work of other philosophers has instead
drawn heavily from research in economics and, more generally, in the social sciences
(e.g., Guala 2005; Reiss 2016).
Notably, literature review can also constitute an original and valuable piece of
research in itself. Review articles come in many trades and different taxonomies are
available as well: they can be critical, literature, mapping, generic, qualitative, rapid,
scoping, state-of-the-art, systematic, systematized, and umbrella reviews (Grant and
Booth 2009). Some classifications follow instead a pragmatic approach. For instance,
the ISI Web of Knowledge Science Citation Index categorizes a paper as a review if
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it either (1) contains more than 100 references; or (2) appears in a review journal or
the review section of a journal; or (3) states in the abstract that it is a review.4
Review articles are published in philosophy journals too. For example, the jour-
nal Philosophy Compass publishes original, peer-reviewed survey articles of the most
important research from across the entire discipline. In its section on Naturalistic Phi-
losophy it is possible to find entries on topics such as the “Experimental Philosophy
of Aesthetics” (Cova et al. 2015) or “Causation: Empirical Trends and Future Direc-
tions” (Rose and Danks 2012). Rather than providing a basis for the researchers’ own
endeavors, this type of literature review creates a solid starting point for all other
members of the community that are interested in a particular topic, and who can refer
to these reviews to support some of their claims. Further, if philosophers wish to have
impact outside their field too, it becomes advisable to have review articles that present
the state of the art on a particular philosophical topic and the main results, so that
scientists, policy makers, or any member of a particular profession can more easily
become acquainted with the status of a philosophical debate and avoid taking onboard
questionable assumptions in their practice. Such review articles can also prove to be
useful tools for teaching purposes, providing students with a balanced treatment of a
particular topic.
3 Heuristics and biases in literature search and review
So far, it has been suggested that naturalistic philosophers rely on literature search and
review in their philosophical work. In light of this, however, it will now be shown how
naturalistic philosophers also seem to face a number of hurdles. More precisely, here
it is argued that biases can in fact compromise the reliability of processes of literature
search and review. Section 3.1 introduces some of the possible relevant heuristics and
biases. Section 3.2 discusses heuristics and biases in relation to the growing number
of research outputs available in the literature. Finally, Sect. 3.3 discusses and rebuts a
possible objection.
3.1 The impact of biases on search and review
Naturalistic philosophers need to carefully consider the fact that literature search and
review are likely to be constrained by cognitive limitations and vulnerable to biases.
Scientists sometimes warn of these risks. For instance, Roy Baumeister wrote that:
Although literature reviews are less subject than empirical investigations to
capitalizing on chance, they are probably more susceptible to the danger of
confirmation bias. Many good literature reviews involve seeing a theoretical
pattern or principle in multiple spheres of behavior and evidence, and putting
together such a paper undoubtedly involves an aggressive search for evidence
that fits the hypothesized pattern (1997, p. 319).
4 (http://wokinfo.com/essays/impact-factor/).
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These considerations are not at all untethered. As it turns out, over the past five decades
psychologists have documented many ways in which our reasoning and decision-
making can be systematically biased by cognitive, motivational and affective factors
(Hastie and Dawes 2010). People have been shown to deploy heuristics that in several
contexts lead to a number of biases and, in turn, poor or ill-grounded decision-making.
Philosophers have been hugely interested in this psychological literature (Samuels
et al. 2002; Lee et al. 2013; Saul 2013; Polonioli 2014). Still, a point that has not been
properly acknowledged in the philosophical literature is that there are also good reasons
to think that biases and cognitive limitations might generally have a huge and negative
impact on literature search and reviews. After all, literature search and review are
just a specific case of information search and related judgment and decision-making,
where the latter have been described as riddled with biases. In brief, scholars and
scientists typically search for relevant information, process it, and form a number of
judgments about the information reviewed. Arguably, the same processes that underlie
many other instances of information search and assessment are likely to be at work on
these occasions as well.
Search for evidence can be biased in critical ways. An obvious and well-known bias
is the abovementioned confirmation bias, which consists in the “seeking or interpreting
of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in
hand” (Nickerson 1998, p. 175). When people seek new information, their information
search processes are often biased in favor of the seekers’ previously held beliefs,
expectations, or desired conclusions. For example, people have been shown to favor
information that supports their social stereotypes (Johnston 1996), attitudes (Lundgren
and Prislin 1998), expectations in negotiations (Pinkley et al. 1995), and self-serving
conclusions. Arguably, if a researcher is carrying out a literature review on the positive
psychological effects of holding a particular sort of belief, such as believing in free
will, confirmation biases might result in her ignoring undesired information and her
focusing on what seems to support her previously held belief.
Moreover, consider research on implicit biases, where the latter are typically under-
stood as ‘largely unconscious tendencies to automatically associate concepts with one
another’ (Saul 2013, p. 244). Whilst there are still a number of open questions regarding
the nature and frequency of implicit biases, what seems to be supported by copious
evidence is that decision makers are often biased by people’s gender, ethnic back-
ground, and sexual preference, for example when they select job candidates based
on CVs, and also by people’s appearance (especially weight and height in relation to
gender) when they interview job candidates (Steinpreis et al. 1999). If these biases
can result in judging members of stigmatized groups negatively, it is not difficult to
see how they could impact on the search and assessment of scholarly information.
Research published by researchers from particular groups might be just ignored or its
value might be slighted.5
Further, consider how people have been shown to heavily rely on what is most
salient or available to them in their judgment and decision-making (Tversky and Kah-
neman 1973). In particular, recent occurrences, because they are cognitively more
5 The importance of the topic of discrimination against authors has recently gained importance and attention
in philosophy: http://www.diversityreadinglist.org.
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salient, often lead people to misrepresent the probability of certain types of events.
For instance, “the subjective probability of traffic accidents rises temporarily when one
sees a car overturned” (p. 11). People are apt to accept one of two competing views
merely because they heard evidence supporting the one view more recently (Kahne-
man and Tversky 1982). In light of this, it is not unlikely that researchers trying to
organize findings in support of a particular hypothesis will rely on partial, although
quite salient or easily accessible, information.
Finally, researchers attempting to deliver an evenhanded treatment of the literature
are supposed to discuss which views are more and less widely shared. But evidence
from several studies suggests that social observers tend to perceive a form of egocentric
bias with respect to the relative commonness of their responses. The best-known
example comes from a 1977 study in which Ross, Greene and House asked students
to walk around a campus wearing a sandwich board with the word ‘repent’ on it.
Students could agree to wear the board, doing the experimenters a favor, or disagree
and participate in a later study. Those who offered to wear the sign (50%) estimated
that more than half of their peers would also agree to do so (average estimation
63.5%). Those who declined thought that about a quarter of those asked would accept
(average estimation 23.3%). Apparently, students overestimated how similar others’
preferences were to their own. These findings might be taken to suggest, for example,
that researchers trying to assess the popularity of a particular view or account might
produce inaccurate assessments of its popularity (Gilovich 1990).
Overall, confirmation biases, salience and availability biases, as well as false con-
sensus biases are among the many effects and distortions that might impact on literature
search and review. There are no compelling reasons to assume that naturalistic philoso-
phers would be immune from such biases. After all, it seems that everybody is affected
by biases to some degree, irrespective of factors like general intelligence or open mind-
edness (Stanovich and West 2008). Though expertise in specific domains might have
positive effects on judgment and decision-making, some findings indicate that experi-
enced professionals often display either roughly the same biases as college students or
the same biases at somewhat reduced levels. More precisely, psychological research
has demonstrated that a wide variety of biases often affect the assessments that many
professionals, including physicians, investors, accountants, option traders, real estate
agents, engineers, and psychologists, are trained to make (e.g., McNeil et al. 1982;
Choi and Pritchard 2003; Bazerman et al. 2002; Fox et al. 1996). More recently, it has
been shown that also philosophers tend commit the very same biases (Schwitzgebel
and Cushman 2012, 2015; but see also Livengood et al. 2010). In light of this, it seems
highly plausible that when naturalistic philosophers search for and assess scholarly
content, they can be affected by these biases.
But there is also more direct evidence on the impact of biases in scholarly con-
texts. For instance, Roumbanis (2017) explored anchoring effects, whereby the first
numerical value that an individual encounters tends to influence his or her judgment of
what is to be assessed, in the process of peer reviewing research proposals. Yet there
have also been studies on biases in the process of literature selection and assessment.
For instance, literature on biases in literature selection has suggested that factors such
as the reputation and prominence of an author could influence citation decisions (the
so-called “Matthew effect”; Merton 1968). More recently, focus has been placed on
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testing whether female scholars are systematically denied credit for their work (the
so-called “Matilda effect,” Rossiter 1993). In the case of Matilda effects, unconscious
automatic processes are assumed to trigger gender bias. In light of this, an author’s
gender indirectly influences citation behavior, as it functions as a simple cognitive
heuristic to assess scientific quality, challenging the assumption that citations repre-
sent payments of intellectual debt and, to that end, would strictly follow the criteria
of relevance and quality (cf., e.g., the discussion in Baldi 1998). There is growing
evidence on the impact of such biases in scholarly contexts (cf. Lincoln et al. 2012;
Potthoff and Zimmermann 2017).
3.2 “Big science” and heuristics
As it turns out, in the context of literature search and review reliance on heuristics
seems quite likely to occur, also because of the increasing and huge amount of research
materials published. Herbert Simon claimed that ‘human rational behavior is shaped
by a pair of scissors whose blades are the structure of task environments and the
computational capabilities of the actor’ (1990, p. 7). Whilst an important generalization
that comes out of efforts to study human information processing is that an individual is
a limited information processing system (Newell and Simon 1972), it is also the case
that researchers have to face a rather complex environment in the case of literature
search and review, as the relevant literature is huge and the database of papers and
noteworthy content is not only massive but also growing fast, as explained by Derek De
Solla Price in his “Little science, big science…and beyond” (1986) (see also Génova
et al. 2016). Specifically, the volume of research available in most fields is expanding
rapidly and there has been an increase in the rate of published outputs, although it is
less clear to what extent this might reflect an increase in knowledge accumulation or
rather a tendency to “slice” one research project into too many papers (i.e., “salami
publishing”). What is clearer, instead, is that in light of people’s memory and cognitive
limitations, recall of huge amounts of relevant information and literature might be far
from optimal. Moreover, in light of people’s computational limitations, analyses of
huge databases of scholarly content might also be far from optimal.
Clearly, not all of the processes interfering with the reliability of outcomes of lit-
erature search and review need to be unconscious. In addition to the abovementioned
unconscious biases, naturalistic philosophers could also be deliberately adopting ques-
tionable strategies in processing the literature, resulting for instance in more favorable
treatment of close colleagues. Yet unconscious biases are particularly worrisome, as
they are hardly detected by the agent. Correction of distorting factors seems harder
to occur than one might think, and it has recently been suggested that rationalization
of biased choices or judgments might be common in the work of philosophers and
scientists as well (Schwitzgebel and Ellis 2016).
3.3 How smart can simple heuristics be?
A possible objection needs to be addressed, though. To be sure, heuristics do not
just lead to critical biases. In some contexts, people have also been shown to deploy
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heuristics that enable them to gather and assess information effectively (Gigerenzer
2000).6 Fast-and-frugal heuristics that take into account only few cues and little of the
available information might lead to accurate predictions and estimates in a number of
contexts, and such adaptive heuristics might also be at work in the context of literature
search and review. This is an important point. Yet, whilst it is important not to overlook
this more positive view of our decision-making performance (Robins and Craik 1993;
Christensen-Szalanski and Beach 1984; Lopes 1991), such acknowledgment should
not be read as being at odds with the recognition of the impact of the abovementioned
biases and their problematic nature. In addition, it is also unclear to what extent the most
plausible heuristics at work in this context could be successful. The most prominent
cues to be used as proxies for the value of the relevant content are likely to be the
number of articles’ citations, the Journal Impact Factor, or similar metrics. But it can
take long time for an article to accumulate citations, especially in the humanities,
meaning that it is hard to use such number as a cue to identify relevant published
material. Further, whilst it is sometimes argued that social media activity provides
useful indications for the future citations, recent research suggests that altmetrics are
best conceived of as measuring a different kind of research impact (Erdt et al. 2016).
Moreover, the view that Journal Impact Factor is a reliable indicator of the quality of
journals has been heavily criticized (e.g., Moustafa 2014) and a number of authors have
pointed out that it does not necessarily correlate with several aspects of the journal’s
quality (Brembs et al. 2013).
Overall, there are good reasons to carefully consider the heuristics and biases that
might be operating in the context of literature search and review. Because of these
factors, and especially in an environment characterized by growing scholarly produc-
tion, researchers might find it difficult to process information in a way that serves well
and furthers goals of accuracy and truth. But if common research practices do not
serve these goals well, then this should look like a worrying situation for researchers.
The question arises as to what options are available to remedy the situation described
above. Arkes et al. (2006, 2010) referred to work on the inaccuracy of judgment
and decision-making (e.g., Dawes et al. 1989) to urge that we should “examine the
benefits of a more routinized, mechanical method for evaluating scientific materials
such as research presentations at professional conventions or proposals submitted to
federal funding agencies” (2006, p. 430). The next section examines precisely ways to
improve the reliability of the survey of research materials in the context of literature
reviews by appealing to systematic methodologies.
4 Narrative and systematic methods for literature review
Biases threaten the reliability of literature search and review. But different types of
search and review differ in terms of vulnerability. Section 4.1 characterizes narrative
methods for literature search and review, which are typically used in philosophy.
6 Also, Mercier and Sperber (2011) argue that biases such as confirmation can be adaptive as truth might
not be the relevant goal in many conversational contexts. Still, in case of scholarly research, relevant goals
seem to be epistemic in nature.
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Section 4.2 introduces the framework of systematic reviews. Section 4.3 discusses
different formats and common criteria in systematic reviews. Section 4.4 addresses
and rebuts some possible objections to the use of systematic reviews.
4.1 Beyond purely narrative approaches
In philosophy, as well as in many other fields in the humanities, literature search and
review is typically “narrative” in character (but see Feltz and Cova 2014), whereby a
content expert writes about a particular topic offering a comprehensive narrative syn-
thesis of previously published materials, usually not describing the methods deployed
and the criteria for inclusion and review of the literature. In brief, the authors of nar-
rative reviews are free to include and exclude research as they like, and they are free
in their evaluation of research too. For instance, in her synthesis of the literature on
framing effects, Joanna Demaree-Cotton writes the following: “I have included all
relevant studies of which I am aware” (2016, p. 9). In this case, the author is explicitly
acknowledging the lack of objective selection criteria in her study. More commonly,
however, the nature of the criteria for inclusion and methods for literature search and
selection is not even addressed in published papers within philosophy. Consider, for
example, a paper recently published in Philosophical Psychology, in which Smithdeal
(2016) reviewed empirical evidence allegedly suggesting that belief in free will is
beneficial. His review was narrative in character: the author appealed to some sources
suggesting that belief in free will offers valuable support for prosocial behavior (Vohs
and Schooler 2008; Baumeister et al. 2009), and then criticised some studies point-
ing to possible detrimental effects of belief in free will (Nadelhoffer and Tocchetto
2013). Notably, failure to disclose selection strategies and decisions might in fact
matter quite a lot here. Besides the referenced sources, which suggest that disbelief
in free will is linked with a decreased willingness to help others, some other studies
examining how free will beliefs influence true self-knowledge (Seto and Hicks 2016)
seem to be highly relevant to the research question addressed by Smithdeal’s paper.
It is hard to tell, however, if the author was aware of the existence of this study and,
in case he was, why or how such sources were excluded. Further, relevant studies
have been published after the publication of Smithdeal’s paper. Notably, Caspar et al.
(2017) provided further evidence that disbelief in free will had a positive impact on the
morality of decisions toward others. Would this paper feature in the author’s analysis,
should he be writing it today? Being unable to answer this question seems to represent
a limitation of current narrative methodologies. As this example might reveal, popular
narrative methods for search and review seem to offer room for biases and cherry
picking, and reviews which use these approaches risk being subjective and hardly
replicable.
4.2 Systematic reviews and bias minimization
Interestingly, outside philosophy it has been frequently pointed out that traditional
narrative reviews, in spite of some clear benefits, are also prone to error and bias.
More precisely, whilst some researchers have suggested ways to reduce bias in lit-
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erature search and review by improving traditional narrative approaches to review
(Baumeister 2013), many others have argued that more rigorous and unbiased types of
analysis should be offered to replace traditional narrative reviews (Kitsiou et al. 2013;
Templier and Parè 2015). In particular, in the 1970s and early 1980s, scientists started
to draw attention to the systematic steps needed to minimize bias and random errors
in reviews of research (Light and Smith 1971; Glass 1976; Rosenthal 1978; Jackson
1980; Cooper 1982). In this context, scientists appealed to systematic reviews as a use-
ful tool to navigate through complex bodies of literature and summarize them in a way
that reduces bias. In the huge literature on systematic approaches to literature review,
the adjective ‘systematic’ is typically contrasted with ‘haphazard study selection pro-
cedures’ or even ‘arbitrary study selection procedures’ (Slavin 1986, p. 6). It should
be noted, however, that systematic reviews should also be distinguished here from
meta-analyses: only when results are mathematically combined (a process sometimes
referred to as pooling), this is referred to as meta-analysis. As the Cochrane Collab-
oration Handbook points out, in the case of systematic reviews “statistical methods
(meta-analysis) may or may not be used to analyse and summarise the results of the
included studies” (Higgins and Green 2011).7
The appeal of systematic reviews varies from field to field. In the health sciences,
systematic reviews have now become a standard and are well understood by all
contemporary practitioners. Three decades ago, Mulrow et al. lamented hat “med-
ical reviews are often subjective, unsound and inefficient”, and that “strategies for
identifying and selecting information are rarely defined” (1987, p. 485). But things
changed significantly in the following years (Bracken 2001). In other fields, instead,
systematic reviews are still not mainstream. For example, consider the field of psy-
chology. Narrative methods of review have been dominant and widely taught for
long time. Some researchers encouraged authors of reviews “to take a point of view
based on theory and offer readers a point of view that integrates the review” (Stern-
berg 1991, p. 3). Currently, some journals, like Psychological Bulletin, increasingly
are publishing systematic reviews, while others, such as Trends in Cognitive Sci-
ences, still publish narrative reviews only, as does the Annual Review of Psychology
too.
4.3 Formats and criteria for systematic reviews
Systematic reviews often address a question formulated in the Participants (Popula-
tion), Intervention, Comparisons, Outcome (PICO) format. The question identifies a
population, the intervention being investigated, a comparison point or points to the
intervention, and the outcome of interest (Higgins and Green 2011, section 5.1.1). For
example, a researcher might ask, “for older adults with musculoskeletal disorders, is
home-based rehabilitation more effective than inpatient rehabilitation in relation to
function, cognition and quality of life?” (Stolee et al. 2012). Within this framework,
7 Hence, objections to systematic reviews which critique their application of statistical methods for evidence
aggregation will not be discussed here (e.g., Stegenga 2011), as the use of meta-analytic tools is not essential
to the argument made here.
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questions might be quite diverse in their nature, and in the medical field they might for
instance seek to explore possible harm (e.g., will there be any negative effects?), prog-
nosis (e.g., what is the likely outcome of this problem?), or etiology (e.g., what causes
this problem?) of a particular effect. Further, systematic reviews may ask broader or
narrower questions, and it is generally important to strike a balance between compre-
hensiveness and precision when developing a search strategy for a question. In brief,
increasing the comprehensiveness of a search might result in reducing its precision
and retrieving more irrelevant articles.
Systematic review methods often use peer-reviewed and published protocols to lay
out the methods for a review: searches for studies, articles screening for relevance and
quality, and data extraction and synthesis are typically undertaken according to a pre-
determined strategy. Different protocols for systematic reviews are typically followed
in different disciplines. Methods in environmental sciences are outlined by the Collab-
oration for Environmental Evidence, in social sciences by the Campbell Collaboration
and in medicine by the Cochrane Collaboration.
It is interesting to note that in several contexts, and especially outside the health
and biomedical sciences, the PICO model has appeared to be too narrow and strict.
For instance, Strech et al. (2008) tried to offer a model of systematic reviews for
empirical bioethics, which is a field that heavily relies on interviews studies. Strech et
al. advocated a model based on Methodology, Issue, Participants for review questions
over the PICO format (2008, p. 473). The authors proposed a model based on 7-steps
for systematic reviews of empirical bioethics: (1) careful definition of review question;
(2) selection of relevant databases; (3) application of ancillary search strategies; (4)
development of search algorithms; (5) relevance assessment of the retrieved references;
(6) quality assessment of included studies; and (7) data analysis and presentation.
Attempts such as this one suggest that it is indeed possible to pursue systematic
reviews even in cases where the PICO model appears to be too narrow.
Yet, even in the biomedical and health sciences equal emphasis on each component
of PICO is not necessary. For example, Shumway-Cook et al. (1997) address “the
effect of multidimensional exercises on balance, mobility, and fall risk in community-
dwelling older adults”, referring to a population, outcome and effect, but do not
state a comparison in their question. Furthermore, systematic reviews of definitions
and operationalizations of concepts and notions used in biomedical and health sci-
ences have recently been offered, whereby such studies clearly depart from the PICO
model described above (e.g., Bruce et al. 2001; Hajarizadeh et al. 2012). For example,
Sørensen et al. (2012) seek to systematically address definitions and conceptualiza-
tions of the concept of health literacy.
This discussion should show how the systematic approach to literature search and
review has been implemented in different ways in different contexts. Importantly,
however, irrespective of the specific layout of the systematic review, the criteria used
to select studies for inclusion should be clearly stated, alongside the bibliographic
databases searched, the dates and periods searched and any constraints, such as lan-
guage. More precisely, in addition to describing the search strategy, selection and data
collection process, systematic reviews should also clearly discuss their objectives. In
brief, systematic reviews seem to differ from traditional narrative reviews by virtue of
being:
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Systematic/organized: Systematic reviews are conducted according to a system
or method that is designed in relation to and specifically to address the question
the review is setting out to answer.
Transparent/explicit: The method used in the review is explicitly stated.
Replicable/updatable: As with many forms of primary research, the method and
the way it is reported should be sufficiently detailed and clear such that other
researchers can repeat the review, repeat it with modifications or update it.
Synthesize/summarize: Systematic reviews pull together in a structured and orga-
nized way the results of the review in order to summarize the evidence relating
to the review question.
As it turns out, whilst systematic reviews might follow different protocols and focus on
somewhat different questions, they are nevertheless supposed to incorporate a set of key
principles of scientific methodology and depart from traditional narrative approaches to
literature review. For instance, Cooper nicely expresses the spirit behind the systematic
review movement in the introduction to his book, Synthesizing Research:
The approach to research synthesis presented in this book represents a signifi-
cant departure from how reviews had been conducted just 20 years ago. Instead
of a subjective, narrative approach, this book presents an objective systematic
approach. Here, the reader will learn how to carry out an integration of research
according to scientific principles and rules. The intended result is a research
synthesis that can be replicated by others, can create consensus among scholars,
and can focus debate in a constructive fashion (Cooper 1998, p. xi).
Finally, an important aspect to highlight is that systematic reviews are typically con-
ducted in a team. Ensuring that tasks such as selection of studies for inclusion and
data extraction can be performed by at least two people independently may increase
the chance that errors and biases be detected. Importantly, at least when considering
biases like confirmation, there is evidence suggesting that groups perform better than
single individuals. More precisely, although groups in some contexts do fall prey to
some of the errors made by the single individual, for many important biases such as
confirmation, groups outperform individuals (Maciejovsky et al. 2013), and there is
not evidence that single individuals outperform groups.
4.4 Objections and replies
There are a few concerns and objections that need to be cleared up at this stage. A
first worry one might have is that systematic reviews will actually fail to successfully
address and neutralize the problematic impact of biases. On one hand, it is obvious that
systematic methodologies do not completely eliminate subjectivity from the process
of review. After all, when researchers try to operationalize a research question, they are
still called to make some decisions. For instance, one still needs to define what counts
as older population. On the other hand, systematic literature reviews are undertaken
according to strict guidelines to minimize subjectivity, maximize transparency and
replicability, and are supposed to provide a highly reliable review of evidence pertain-
ing to a specific topic. The scientific method has the invaluable benefit of affording a
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systematic and unbiased investigation, and systematic reviews apply it to the practice
of literature search of review. Systematic methods aim at making literature search and
review objective: the reasoning is that subjectivity is a source of bias, and one that
can and must be minimized by developing a clear protocol, making all the steps and
the criteria explicit, following these steps and documenting all the relevant activity.
By so doing, one is likely to maximize the chances of producing valid conclusions,
and also makes the review replicable. It should be noted, here, that the use of the con-
cept “objective” is eminently complicated, as also recent philosophical (e.g., Douglas
2004) and historical (e.g., Daston and Galison 2010) analyses demonstrate. But in
general the objectivity of results is thought to be a consequence of the method being
objective.
Still, some have expressed further qualms about using these methodologies. Whilst
it is frequently argued that the “the use of explicit, systematic methods in reviews limits
bias (systematic errors) and reduces chance effects, thus providing more reliable results
upon which to draw conclusions and make decisions” (Higgins and Green 2011), one
possible objection is that peer review would in any case wash out researchers’ biases,
eventually leading to reliable surveys of the literature. This, however, seems to rely on
too romantic a view of peer review, and one with several problems. Whilst peer review
typically brings a measure of rigor and trust to scholarly communication, the reliability
of peer-review is far from optimal, and several biases in peer review have also been
identified (Lee et al. 2013; Lee 2015; Shalvi et al. 2010). There are well known cases
of so-called Mendel syndrome, mentioned after Gregor Mendel, whose discoveries in
plant genetics were so unprecedented that it took thirty-four years for the scientific
community to catch up to it (Van Raan 2004; Gorry and Ragouet 2016). Moreover,
obvious failures of peer review have also been clearly documented (Hawkes 2013).
Even more importantly, the very fact that systematic reviews and narrative reviews
have, at least in some cases, been shown to deliver results that are at odds suggests that
pointing to peer review as a silver bullet might be an unwarranted move (Cipriani and
Geddes 2003). For instance, De Dreu and Weingart (2003) show in a systematic review
that the relationship between task conflict, team performance and team satisfaction is
largely negative even though both academic papers and textbooks regularly report that
task conflict has a generally positive effect.
Other critics of systematic reviews argue that a major threat to systematic reviews
is dissemination bias, often referred to as publication bias, and which describes the
selective publication and dissemination of results. In this situation, published studies
constitute a biased sample leading to spurious conclusions. Published research can
then be shaped by file-drawer effects (Rosenthal 1979). Again, this does not read as
a knockdown objection, and at least for two reasons. First, whilst systematic reviews
might not solve these problems, narrative reviews do not seem to be obviously better
positioned at dealing with them. An argument would be needed to support this claim.
Second, it actually seems that the methods of systematic reviews can be applied to
the grey literature as well. For instance, these methods can be applied to doctoral
dissertations as well as conference proceedings. In fact, Cochrane systematic reviews
use very comprehensive search strategies and include both published and unpublished
studies. Overall, publication bias is clearly an important problem that the research
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community and research gatekeepers need to address, but also one which is orthogonal
to the debate over the merits of narrative and systematic reviews.
Where does all this lead us? The thrust of the section is not to argue that narra-
tive reviews should be replaced by systematic reviews tout court. Arguably, narrative
reviews have important benefits, including a broad overview of relevant information
tempered by years of knowledge from an experienced author. It is also true that the
narrative thread can be lost in the strict rules of systematic review, which might hin-
der the piece’s readability. As it turns out, the benefits of appealing to a particular
approach might depend on the specific situation. For instance, Baumeister points out
that in some cases:
A narrative rather than a meta-analytic review suits this purpose, in the interest of
presenting a richer description of the prejudice-reduction literature. Moreover,
the methods, interventions, and dependent variables are so diverse that meta-
analysis is potentially meaningless (Baumeister and Leary 1997, see also Hafer
and Bègue 2005), especially given that many of the research designs used in this
literature are prone to bias, rendering their findings unsuitable for meta-analysis.
The point that this section seeks to drive home is that systematic approaches to review
should at least be seen as important complements to traditional methods of literature
search and review, as the former are better placed at reducing bias and increasing repro-
ducibility. Although there is often some tension between the users of the two methods,
and some experts who favour systematic analyses disdain narrative approaches as
obsolete, both methods could actually have a valuable place in science.
5 Systematic reviews for naturalistic philosophers
So far, it has been shown that systematic reviews are methodologies widely employed
in natural, life and health sciences, that they offer important tools to minimize bias and
increase transparency and reproducibility, and that they can come with different (more
or less rigid) formats. Since naturalistic philosophers are also likely to be affected by
critical biases in the process of literature search and review, it seems tempting to con-
clude that they should also carefully consider these tools. Notably, this outcome would
be in line with recent claims put forward by experimental philosophers, which have
suggested that philosophers should expand their toolbox to include a wide array of
methods used in the sciences (Machery 2016; Machery and O’Neill 2014). This essay
indeed recommends a wide application of these systematic tools: philosophers inter-
ested in appealing to empirical evidence in their analyses could benefit from the use
of systematic methods, irrespective of whether such evidence is coming from research
in physics, chemistry or cognitive science. However, there are a few outstanding tasks
before this conclusion can be fully accepted. This section strengthens the case for
systematic reviews in naturalistic philosophy by ironing out the details of the proposal
on offer and addressing some possible concerns. More precisely, Sect. 5.1 shows why
this plea for minimally biased naturalistic philosophy is especially timely and relevant.
Section 5.2 defends the feasibility of systematic reviews within naturalistic philoso-
phy. Section 5.3 addresses and rebuts a possible objection. Finally, Sect. 5.4 delivers
practical recommendations concerning research, publishing and teaching practices.
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5.1 A timely call for systematic reviews
Naturalistic philosophers should find the case made here for the use of systematic
methodologies to be particularly timely and relevant. Systematic methods have already
been recently applied to address some topics and research questions that have attracted
the attention of several philosophers. Notably, in such cases systematic methods have
often played a seemingly corrective function, throwing doubt on some claims that
are widely acclaimed in the literature, or just showing the need for further data to
substantiate particular claims. This seems to suggest that, far from being an unneces-
sary complication in carrying out philosophical projects, systematic reviews might be
powerful tools in the process of selecting and validating one’s evidence.
Consider one of the most important debates in philosophy and cognitive science,
namely that concerning people’s (ir)rationality (e.g., Stich 1990; Stein 1996; Gigeren-
zer 1996; Kahneman and Tversky 1996; Samuels et al. 2002; Oaksford and Chater
2007; Todd and Gigerenzer 2012). One important question in this debate is whether
people’s cognitive biases lead people to worse health, wealth and happiness (e.g., Sun-
stein and Thaler 2008; Bortolotti and Antrobus 2015; McKay and Dennett 2009;
Polonioli 2014). As it turns out, these discussions have been taken to have impor-
tant philosophical implications, for instance concerning the normative value of formal
principles of rationality based on logic, probability theory and rationality decision
theory (e.g., Larrick et al. 1993; Wallin 2013; Polonioli 2014; Boudry et al. 2016).
One frustrating aspect in the debate is that these discussions are typically carried
out at quite an abstract level. Still, a recent innovation in the debate on rationality
has been to appeal to more systematic methodologies in literature search and review.
Specifically, Arkes et al. (2016) tried to address the relationship between biases and
such outcomes by conducting “several systematic Web of Knowledge searches for the
major coherence rules reported in the literature”, briefly outlining the search proce-
dures and reporting, among other findings, “little evidence that coherence violations
incur material costs” (Arkes et al. 2016, p. 22). Their findings led some scholars to
conclude that:
Systematic literature searches show lack of evidence that these cognitive illu-
sions, even if they existed, would cause actual harm in terms of less wealth,
health, or happiness (Arkes et al. 2016; Berg and Gigerenzer 2010) (Mousavi
et al. 2016, p. 281).
As it turns out, the study by Arkes et al. (2016) is by no means conclusive but should
at least be seen as a small step in the right direction: by complementing narrative
approaches with more objective, structured and systematic searches and reviews it is
possible to push forward important debates and, where needed, correct any unwar-
ranted claims. There have been other applications of systematic methods to address
topics of interest to philosophers. For instance, philosophers have often embraced
the assumption that emotions and affective processes cause moral judgment. Philoso-
pher Joshua May writes that “scientists have apparently amassed converging evidence
that emotions play a substantial role in the production of most, if not all, of our moral
judgments” (2014, p. 125). But Landy and Goodwin (2015; see, however, also Schnall
et al. 2015) offer a systematic review in which they consider both published and unpub-
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lished studies, eventually arguing “against some claims about the role of affect in moral
judgments” (p. 518).
Still, there are further reasons to be wary of cherry picking and to appreciate the
benefits of a more systematic approach to literature search and review. In particular, the
crisis of findings’ reproducibility in psychology (Open Science Collaboration 2015;
Pashler and Harris 2012) and other fields (Baker 2016) clearly highlights a number of
relevant issues. For instance, several big-name findings and effects that have influenced
philosophical discussions have recently failed to replicate, and it is important that
replication studies are also considered. Notably, there has been a good deal of interest
in philosophy in “stereotype threat”, even recently (e.g., Schouten 2015; McKinnon
2014). The original study, authored by Shih et al. (1999), found that Asian women
performed worse on a math test when primed to think about their female identity,
but better when they were primed to think about their Asian identity. Whilst widely
disseminated in textbooks and papers, this finding has suffered from some failed
attempts to replicate (e.g. Moon and Roeder 2014; Gibson et al. 2014). Consider,
also, research on the “unconscious thought hypothesis”, which is often discussed in
the philosophical literature (e.g., Frankish 2010; Levy 2014). Interestingly, findings
suggesting the value of unconscious decision-making happen to have a record of
failed replications (e.g. Calvillo and Penaloza 2009; Huizenga et al. 2012). Systematic
methodologies offer important tools to portray a more accurate and balanced picture
of science by encouraging the inclusion and discussion of replications as well.
Hopefully, combinations of narrative and systematic approaches will soon become
more popular also within naturalistic philosophy. Many questions that have attracted
the attention of philosophers, such as whether psychopathy increases propensity to
engage in immoral behavior compared to subjects without it, or whether intelligence
increases the likelihood of achieving good life outcomes in healthy subjects, can be
tackled using the framework of systematic reviews. Exploring whether conclusions
typically reached via narrative literature reviews would stand in light of the application
of systematic tools seems an important task for naturalistic philosophers, and one in
line with the mission of critically appraising scientific projects.
5.2 The feasibility of systematic reviews
Having provided further support to the claim that naturalistic philosophers would
greatly benefit from the application of systematic reviews, this section comments
further on the feasibility of systematic approaches. Specifically, one might argue that
formats such as PICO are too narrow for the purposes of naturalistic philosophers. But
there is no compelling reason to consider systematic methodologies to be unfeasible.
Philosophers should not necessarily apply the PICO model previously described.
The PICO model could be reasonably applied in those cases in which philosophers refer
to experimental methods that use comparisons and focus on specific outcomes, but it
fits less nicely qualitative research, where the latter might still be of interest to some
empirically minded philosophers of mind who are looking for evidence coming from
interviews to inform their analyses. For such cases, less strict formats of systematic
reviews, such as those discussed in the previous section, seem to be preferable. Further,
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the very fact that systematic methodologies for search and review have already been
introduced in some areas of the humanities and social sciences seems to speak in favor
of the feasibility of the proposal made in this paper (Strech et al. 2008).
In fact, there are several possible applications of systematic methodologies that
would depart from the PICO model. One natural application of systematic reviews
is to explore the definitions and operationalizations of various concepts in relevant
literatures. For instance, consider Machery’s (2009) challenge to the view that the
concept of “concept” has been used in the same sense in philosophy and in cognitive
science. This is one instance in which definitions and operationalisations of the concept
could be fruitfully explored in a systematic way. But there are certainly many other
possible applications. For instance, consider research on confabulatory phenomena,
which were originally discussed in the context of patients with Korsakoff syndrome
with severe amnesia. When asked what they did on a particular day, they would report
as memories events that either did not happen or had happened much earlier in the
patient’s life (e.g., Berlyne 1972). Some philosophers have recently criticized defi-
nitions of confabulation currently available in the scientific literature (e.g., Hirstein
2005; Robins 2016), but attempts to improve or reform the definitions used in a par-
ticular scientific literature seem to assume an accurate characterization of the ways in
which the relevant phenomenon has been defined in the literature. As it turns out, the
latter task is descriptive and well served by using systematic methodologies. Notably,
systematic reviews of definitions seem to be one particular application of systematic
reviews that might be of great interest and benefit research even beyond naturalistic
philosophy.
Whilst systematic methodologies can indeed be successfully applied by philoso-
phers, this is not to deny that some changes might be required in order to adapt the
systematic approach to the field of philosophy, which is also interested in subject
areas that are characterized by less rigid terminology than that used, for instance, in
biomedicine (making comprehensive searching more challenging). More precisely,
traditional systematic reviews prefer databases that include a wide range of publica-
tions of clinical trials, such as MEDLINE and EMBASE, and usually deal with issues
(such as specific diseases and interventions) and study designs (such as randomized
controlled trials) that correspond well to the controlled vocabulary of such databases.
Research of relevance to naturalistic philosophers is often indexed in databases other
than MEDLINE and EMBASE, and because of the heterogeneity of the search terms
that are relevant for naturalistic philosophy and are used by different databases, search
algorithms for systematic reviews by naturalistic philosophers have to be adapted to the
databases’ vocabulary to enhance the sensitivity and specificity of literature searches.
Still, whilst defining the best search strategies and most suitable databases are
important practical issues, these certainly should not and do not only concern philoso-
phers. In several disciplines there are ongoing discussions about the most suitable
databases for systematic reviews (Bramer et al. 2013, 2016; Gehanno et al. 2013;
Martin-Martin et al. 2017; Vassar et al. 2017). Most likely, the ideal combination of
databases that naturalistic philosophers should use will depend on the specific ques-
tion they address. For instance, empirical papers published in philosophy journals and
articles published in social sciences journals might not be displayed in databases such
as PubMed and Scopus.
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There are other important questions that naturalistic philosophers will need to
address. For instance, how will a systematic review include or exclude studies based
on quality? Would it be based on sample size or on p values? This is an important and
burning question, for instance, in contemporary debates in psychology, which stress
the need to improve statistical practices. Clearly, there can be disagreements on the
choices made by authors with regard to these issues, but by making criteria explicit
authors make themselves more easily accountable for their choices and favor method-
ological transparency and awareness of the importance of assessing the quality of the
studies rather than accepting empirical conclusions at face value. The upshot of this
section is that there are not obvious reasons why naturalistic philosophers should not
adopt systematic approaches to literature search and review.
5.3 Objection
Yet, a possible objection here is that naturalistic philosophers should let scientists
review empirical literature systematically, and simply rely on the results of their
systematic analyses. There are some problems with this claim, though. First, this
rejoinder would still acknowledge that philosophers should pay close attention to
results obtained via systematic methods, and just rejects the claim that philosophers
should actively deploy such methods. In other words, philosophers should still appre-
ciate that systematic reviews would constitute a privileged source of evidence to use
in their philosophical work. Second, it also seems that by engaging directly with
systematic methodologies, philosophers would disengage in part from the agenda of
particular sciences, and would be able to contribute to redirect it towards topics that
are especially important to philosophers. More precisely, there are plenty of topics that
are of great interest to philosophers and that could be target of systematic method-
ologies. Consider a naturalistic philosopher interested in exploring whether conscious
decision-making leads to better outcomes than non-conscious one: being able to prop-
erly apply systematic tools would greatly help her in her philosophical work. Instead,
by relying passively on the syntheses provided by scientists, philosophers would risk
failing to adequately answer questions that have been traditionally central in their
disciplines. Further, experimental philosophers have also produced empirical work
themselves, and they should be able to review their findings systematically, instead of
expecting non-philosophers to accomplish the task for them.
5.4 Practical recommendations
The case for systematic methodologies made in this paper has several noteworthy and
direct implications for research, publishing and teaching practices in the philosophi-
cal community. It is helpful to widely underscore the importance of using objective
and transparent procedures during search and review to authors, readers, and other
stakeholders in the philosophical community. In particular, journal editors should
consider updating their journals’ instructions for authors, which are the main way
of communication between researchers, publishers and journal editors and serve as
a readily available tool for reaching potential authors. Clearly written instructions
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may provide assistance throughout the whole process of manuscript preparation and
it is a journal’s obligation to update instructions and inform authors about editorial
policies, manuscript preparation preferences and requirements of accompanying doc-
uments for each submission (Gasparyan et al. 2014; Horvat et al. 2016). Journals’
editors should consider revising such guidelines to both emphasize the importance of
transparent reporting and refer to external guidance on the best practices to conduce
literature reviews and report results, such as the PRISMA Statement (http://www.
prisma-statement.org). For instance, interested authors can find there a template for
flow diagrams of the literature searching and sifting process. These diagrams provide
the readers with a thorough and rapid presentation of everything authors did and why
they did.
Further, journal editors can also encourage authors to release their datasets as part of
a more general commitment to openness and reproducibility of findings. For instance,
the Open Science Framework (http://osf.io/) offers resources for research collabora-
tion, including the storage of documents and data. Prospective authors of systematic
reviews could also be encouraged to pre-register their systematic review, closely pre-
specifying the review design and criteria. As previously discussed, in the same way
as it occurs with any prior preparation of an empirical study, in which its development
should be preceded by a clearly defined question, an appropriately formulated problem
and some background that justifies it, before embarking on the difficult task of prepar-
ing and publishing a systematic review, it is recommended to define the problem to
be addressed and the specific aims and strategies that will guide the process. Planned
systematic reviews can also be pre-registered, and support for study pre-registration is
increasing: websites such as the Open Science Framework (http://osf.io/) and AsPre-
dicted (http://AsPredicted.org/) offer services to preregister various kinds of studies.
For instance, registered reports have been adopted by over 70 journals, covering a
wide range of life, social and physical sciences (http://cos.io/rr/#journals). Impor-
tantly, journals can do more than merely advise on best practices and refer to external
sources. For instance, they can provide incentives to more objective and transparent
practices by acknowledging objective and open practices with badges in publications.
This has now become more common in fields such as psychology. In addition, jour-
nals in the field of philosophy could also consider introducing a new article type, i.e.
systematic review.8
Finally, it is also advisable to introduce training in systematic methodologies in
educational contexts, in an attempt to equip students with tools and guidelines to bet-
ter navigate extensive and growing bodies of literature. Interestingly, there have been
some recent discussions on whether curricula in philosophy should now be updated
to include also training in statistics, given that a growing number of philosophers are
8 This might be of special interest to journals specialized in work at the interface of philosophy and
science. Systematic reviews could also be included in new editorial projects. For instance, philosopher
De Cruz has recently made a case for the importance of launching a journal in experimental philosophy:
http://philosopherscocoon.typepad.com/blog/2016/04/journal-of-experimentalphilosophyexpressions-of-
interest.html . A journal specialized in such area, alongside many others with interests in naturalistic
philosophy, would greatly benefit from the introduction of a new article type.
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now reading and assessing empirical material (Knobe 2016).9 It is also the case, how-
ever, that providing training on how to apply systematic reviews and discussing their
virtues and limitations will also greatly improve philosophical education, resulting in
philosophers being better positioned at using and discussing empirical literature.
6 Conclusion
In summary, this essay has attempted to highlight and discuss some overlooked prob-
lems with the methodology of naturalistic philosophy and to point to solutions that
might help overcome them. More precisely, it has firstly been stressed that naturalistic
philosophers have not adequately reflected on the obvious and yet important fact that
literature search and review are likely to be affected by widespread and systematic
biases. This has been shown to be highly worrying, as naturalistic philosophers do
not typically philosophize in a vacuum, and in fact seem to rely on literature search
and review in a number of ways and for several purposes. The suggested solution to
tackle these problems comes from scientific disciplines. Whilst naturalistic philoso-
phers have recently started to look at methods and tools from the sciences to expand
their methodological toolkit and offer philosophy better chances of accomplishing its
goals, it turns out that the tradition of systematic reviews of literature from scientific
disciplines has been unduly neglected. But systematic reviews are important tools
that minimize bias and allow for reproducibility and transparency. The upshot of this
investigation is that, if naturalistic philosophers wish to reduce bias in philosophy, as
it is here assumed that they should, they should consider ways to supplement their
traditional tools for literature search and review by including systematic reviews.
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